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COMMENTS
THE DEFENSE OF STERILITY IN PATERNITY CASES
SIDNEY B. SClATKn*
Decision usually goes against the accused man in a paternity
case, if the issue is solely one of fact and credibility. If the accused
succeeds, however, in injecting the necessary doubt, he will prevail.
Or if he successfully presents and develops a defense of law, he will
secure an acquittal. Or, if he successfully presents and develops a
scientific or medical defense, he will prevail. Specifically, if he
proves that he was sterile at the time of possible conception of the
child, or shows that there was a high degree of probability of ster-
ility, he should be acquitted.
In considering the great contribution of science to the law,
we may aptly paraphrase an utterance of Sir Winston Churchill's:
"Never before have so many owed so much to so fewl" Scientists
in their laboratories, and physicians pursuing and developing their
specialties, have made discoveries of great social and legal signifi-
cance. Scientific discoveries have not only prevented miscarriages
of justice, but also have gone far to discourage the institution of false
claims. Scientific testimony and proof have proven to be an effective
weapon against blackmail.
Regularly in our courts, blood test exclusions exonerate a wrong-
fully accused man. An innocent man may rest more secure with
the knowledge that a scientific blood test may be available to him
as a shield against blackmail. In any event, blood tests act as a
deterrent against the institution of false claims of paternity.
It has been argued that sterility is controversial. Even if we
assume that to be so, medical evidence of sterility is nevertheless
infinitely superior to testimonial evidence. For the court to ignore
medical evidence of sterility, unshaken by cross-examination and
uncontradicted, is a miscarriage of justice.
* Member of the New York Bar, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of
New York. Mr. Schatkin, without doubt America's leading authority on the law
of filiation, has tried over 6,000 paternity cases over the past 25 years. His
book, DiSPUTED PATERNiTY PlocEEDINcs, now in its third edition (1953),
is the only legal text on the subject and enjoys wide usage throughout the
United States. Mr. Schatldn is also the author of many learned articles in legal
and medical journals, both in this country and abroad. For a general medico-
legal introduction to the matter of sterility the reader is referred to Mr.
Schatkin's treatise, pp. 541-547. Ed.
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When cross-examination has not shaken the medical expert's
opinion, counsel often employs the time-worn device of engaging
the medical expert in mutual speculation concerning possibilities.
Is there any possibility that he was not sterile? A very remote possi-
bility. Was there a chance that he was fertile? A very remote
chance.
The New York Court of Appeals stated in Pauley v. Steam
Gauge and Lantern Co.:
"A mere conjecture built upon a bare possibility will not
suffice to transfer the money or property of one man to the
possession and profit of another. As we said in Bond v. Smith,
131 N.Y. 378, food for speculation will not serve as the basis
of a verdict."1
In Lomer v. Meeker, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
"The positive testimony of an unimpeached, uncontradicted
witness cannot be disregarded by court or jury arbitrarily or
capriciously. They are bound to believe, for judicial purposes,
such testimony, and it would, in an instance like this, be the
clear duty of the court to set aside the verdict of a jury founded
upon a disbelief of clear, uncontradicted and undisputed evi-
dence."2
Where medical testimony is unshaken and uncontradicted,
testimonial evidence in the case should not dictate the decision. In
People v. Roetger, a paternity case recently tied in the Children's
Court, Rockland County, New York, complainant entrapped the
defendant by tape-recording a phone conversation with the de-
fendant, which was received in evidence. She entrapped the accused
boy by a series of questions and statements cleverly calculated to
draw from him admissions. (The accused, of course, did not know
that the phone conversation was being recorded.) The following
excerpt from the tape-recording received in evidence, clearly demon-
strates her devious method of erecting evidence against the accused.
(C is the complainant; D, the defendant.)
C. Aren't you worried about anything?
D. Huh?
C. Aren't you worried about anything?
D. No, not now, I don't think.
1 131 N.Y. 90, 100,29 N.E. 991, 1001 (1892).2 25 N.Y. (11 Smith) 361, 363 (1862).
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C. Why?
D. Well, you don't seem to want to cooperate.
C. Yes, I do.
D. What?
C. Now I do.
D. It's a little late, don't you think?
C. Yes, it's too late to get rid of it.
D. What?
C. I said, it's a little-too late, to get rid of the baby.
D. Yeah.
C. But you said you knew some people in Long Island
or California, didn't you?
D. Yep.
C. Well, is it too late to go there?
D. What?
C. Is it too late to go there?
D. I would have to find out about California.
C. Oh, you know about the one from Long Island?
D. That's pretty sure.
C. It is?
D. Yeah, unless they got somebody else or something.
C. Oh! Well-suppose I went away and had it and lived-
made my home in Michigan-for good?
D. What?
C. Suppose I went away-
D. Yeah-
C. Out in Michigan and made my home out there for
good. Would you at least let me give the baby your last name?
D. Would I what?
C. Would you at least let me give your last name?
D. I told you I would.
C. Because, you know it's your baby.
D. What?
C. I said, you know it's your baby.
D. Yeah.
C. Because I don't want to tell my mother.
D. Yeah. I don't blame you. You wouldn't listen before.
I tried to tell you.
C. Well, I figured maybe you would marry me. We got
our blood test, didn't we?
D. Yeah. We didn't use it, though. You should have
known then.
C. Well, you wouldn't marry me after you found out that
I was pregnant. I can give the baby your last name?
D. Yeah.
3
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C. If I ever needed money, would you ever send it to me?
D. If I got it. It all depends. After that trick you pulled,
I shouldn't give you nothing.
C. Well, I don't know, why you just couldn't marry mejust to give the baby a name. Nobody had to know, not even
your mother, and I could have lived by myself, like I said.
D. No.
C. Would you ever want me to send a picture of the baby?
D. Yeah. You can drop me a line, or something, if you
go to Michigan or wherever you go, you know.
C. No, I think if I'm going to have it I might as well keep
it, as long as you'll let me give it your last name I'll be satisfied.
D. Yeah. I told you that. I said I would.
C. You won't marry me, will you?
D. No.
C. Weren't you afraid that night you wanted me to get
an abortion?
D. Certainly I was.
C. And don't forget the baby's birthday, being it's your
baby.3
This artificial, recorded conversation, the tenor of which was
to lull the defendant into a sense of security, almost each question
calculated to damage defendant by eliciting from him a monosyllabic
admission, however half-hearted,-together with her testimonial evi-
dence,-was permitted to control the decision, despite unshaken med-
ical evidence that the defendant was sterile.
In the Roetger case, the child was born on February 24, 1953,
and the mother's prior last menstrual period was May 6 or 9, 1952.
Two physicians testified that defendant was sterile. An examination
in November, 1950, revealed that defendant had severe prostatitis
and seminal vesiculitis. In the summer of 1951, the defendant's
prostate condition not responding satisfactorily, he was examined
by other doctors on September 10, 1952; November 13, 1952; and
April 1, 1953. Medical opinion stamped the defendant sterile during
the critical period of possible conception-May and June, 1952.
The examination of September 10, 1952, disclosed marked oli-
gospermia-a very low sperm count. The first specimen was 8 mil-
lion per c.c., the volume was 5.5 per c.c. Motility was 50%-slug-
gish. The spermatic fluid was tense-not liquefied-all of which is
a sign of sterility.
3 People v. Roetger, Civil No. 13771, Children's Ct., Rockland County,
Dec. 4, 1952.
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The examination of November 11, 1952, revealed that the vol-
ume was 2 c.c.'s; the sperm count was S million per c.c.; motility
was 50%-sluggish.
In the Roetger case, in view of such high probability of sterility
and non-paternity, bordering on certainty, the complainant undoubt-
edly did have sexual relations with another male person, at the time
of conception. By resorting to entrapment of the accused, she
stamped her own case as untrustworthy.
It is important to emphasize this: the New York law authorizes
the court to grant a filiation order if the evidence is "entirely satis-
factory", and "clear and convincing". The evidence must be "suffi-
cient to create a genuine belief in the mind of the trier of the facts
that the defendant is the father of the child."4 Surely, unshaken and
uncontradicted medical evidence of sterility, touching the very heart
of the matter, renders the woman's testimony something less than
"clear and convincing", and "entirely satisfactory". In view of such
uncontradicted testimony, how can the court have a "genuine belief"
that the accused is the father of the child?
A case comes to mind wherein Dr. John MacLeod-one of the
country's leading experts in the field of male reproduction-charac-
terized his own testimony of defendant's sterility "as close to impos-
sible as any scientist can be in things like that" for defendant "to
impregnate a female who gave birth to a normal child on January
29, 1948." Nevertheless, defendant was adjudged the father, and
the filiation order was affirmed on appeal.5
In that case, Bethel v. Peltier, the defendant, a physician, was
charged with being the father of a child born on January 29, 1948,
with conception occurring in April or May, 1947.
The medical witnesses testified as follows: Defendant had had
tuberculosis for about 35 years, which affected his testicles, bringing
about permanent sterility. On December 1, 1948, defendant sub-
mitted to an operation-one testicle was removed and the other
ligated. There had been microscopic examinations of defendant's
semen, which disclosed complete absence of spermatozoa-a condi-
tion which existed from 1942 until the operation on December 1,
1948. Dr. MacLeod himself examined three separate specimens and
found all three devoid of spermatozoa.
4 Commissioner of Public Welfare of City of New York v. Ryan, 238
App. Div. 607, 265 N.Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dep't 1933).
5 Bethel v. Peltier, 278 App. Div. 919, 105 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1951).
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Even if medical evidence of sterility is controversial, it never-
theless injects such a doubt in the case as to prevent the granting
of a filiation order. In any event, what can be more controversial
than testimonial evidence? The complainant's assertions are coun-
tered by the defendant's denials. There is more than a, mere con-
troversy,-there is the sharpest kind of conflict. That conflict can be
resolved if the court will but accept the complete and objective truth
offered by science.
In the Roetger case, the court rendered the following decision:
"The evidence in this case is, in the opinion of the court,
clear, convincing and satisfactory that the defendant, Richard
Roetger, is the father of Deborah Colleen Pieri, the child. The
expert testimony introduced in behalf of the defendant with
respect to alleged sterility is inconclusive. The defendant's
motion to dismiss the petition is denied."6
There are, however, in the law reports, many examples of judi-
cial receptivity toward medical evidence of sterility.
Hughes v. Hughes7 involved the construction of section
1962, subd. 5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides:
"The following presumptions, and no other, are deemed
conclusive:
"5. . . . The issue of a wife cohabitating with her hus-
band, who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legiti-
mate."
In the Hughes case, although the title of the action might indi-
cate otherwise, a wife sued a man, not her husband, for the support
of her child. The wife and her husband, Annabelle and Frank Har-
brauth, were married in 1932 and lived together continuously until
October 1952. Under those circumstances, with continued cohabi-
tation, there was clearly no impotence. Consequently, it would
appear from subdivision 5 of the above statute, that there would
be an indisputable presumption of legitimacy. The wife first had
sexual relations with the defendant Hughes on October 6 or 7, 1952,
and the child was born on June 29, 1953. The Harbrauths, husband
and wife, became reconciled in February or March, 1953 (at which
6 Supra note 3. The case is currently being appealed to the Appellate Divi-
sion, 2d Dep't, on typewritten record.
7 125 Cal. App.2d 866, 271 P.2d 172 (1954).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss3/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
time she was well advanced in pregnancy), and were living together
at the time of the court hearing. Clearly, it could not possibly be
claimed that the husband, Harbrauth, was ever impotent. At the
hearing, medical testimony was given that the husband Harbrauth,
was sterile.
The defendant Hughes, appealing from the judgment against
him, contended that the husband, Harbrauth, must be conclusively
presumed to be the father of the child, in the absence of proof of
his impotency. Subdivision 5 of the above statute makes the pre-
sumption of legitimacy conclusive in the absence of a showing of
impotency.
From the inception of the presumption of legitimacy in the law
of England some hundreds of years ago, the husband's impotency
has always been written into the law as a circumstance rebutting
that presumption. In the equivalent statute, section 1962, subd.
2, of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a husband who is not
impotent is conclusively presumed to be the father of his wife's child.
In the Hughes case the court, although recognizing that the husband
was not impotent, nevertheless permitted medical evidence of steril-
ity to rebut effectively the presumption of legitimacy and affirmed
the judgment.
In Hogeboom v. Hurlburt,8 a paternity case, the complainant's
testimony of sexual relations, conception and birth of the child, was
uncontradicted by defendant, who did not take the stand. His de-
fense consisted of medical evidence of his sterility. The medical
evidence of sterility was given decisive effect by the court, which
dismissed the complaint.
In Department of Public Welfare of City of New York v. Ham-
ilton,9 judgment of filiation was reversed and a new trial ordered.
The appellate court stated in part:
"In our opinion the trial court should have granted an
adjournment upon the statement of defense counsel that he
had additional medical testimony to prove that defendant was
sterile in March, 1951, the alleged time of the conception. The
undisputed expert testimony established that the defendant was
sterile in February, 1953. The issue of fact was close and such
8207 Misc. 997, 141 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Children's Court, Broom County
1955).
9 282 App. Div. 1025, 126 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1953).
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additional testimony would have had material weight in mak-
ing a decision .... "
In Potasz v. Potasz,'0 the defendant testified that he was im-
potent due to an injury received as a child. A medical expert made
an examination of defendant's semen and testified that in his opiniori
it was extremely doubtful if defendant in 1941 could have impreg-
nated the female. The court held that the testimony constituted
substantial evidence to sustain a finding of nonpaternity."-
In conclusion, the medical defense of sterility, to achieve con-
clusive evidentiary effect, must be competently-even skillfully-pre-
sented to the court and jury. Where the defense has not achieved the
desired result, the failure can often be traced to counsel's inade-
quacy.
Science, like anything else, needs competent legal representa-
tion. The tools of science, in the hands of an expert legal craftsman,
cannot fail to accomplish the purpose sought-the establishment of
truth.
10 68 Cal. App.2d 20, 155 P.2d 895 (1945).
11 Id. at 22, 155 P.2d at 896.
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